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1 . -INTRODUCTION 
I n r e c e n t l i t e r a t u r e a t t e n t i o n has been focussed on the r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between t h e ba rga in ing s t r u c t u r e of a count ry and s t r a t e g i e s of t h e 
main a c t o r s i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . For i n s t a n c e comparing the Uni ted 
S t a t e s and Europe, Kassalov has s t a t e d t h a t company ba rga in ing I eaves 
t r a d e - u n i o n s more s u s c e p t i b l e of employérs c o u n t e r - s t r a t e g i e s than 
i n d u s t r y - w i d e b a r g a i n i n g . Indus t ry -wide b a r g a i n i n g i n h i s view enab les 
unions to m a i n t a i n wages i n pe r iods of low economie growth whereas 
company ba rga in ing o f f e r s t r a d e - u n i o n s b e t t e r chances for wage 
improvement i n pe r iods of high economie growth (Kassa lov , 1985) . 
S t r e e c k has argued t h a t i ndus t ry -wide b a r g a i n i n g i n Western Germany i s 
an e x p r e s s i o n of a coo rd ina t ed and s o l i d a r i s t i c union s t r a t e g y whereas 
company b a r g a i n i n g i n Engeland i s the r e s u l t of a fragmented and 
s e c t i o n a l union s t r a t e g y ( S t r e e c k , 1984) . The l a t t e r s t r a t e g y would 
p a r t l y e x p l a i n for t h e predicament of the B r i t i s h economy and t h e 
' i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r t h r i t i s ' p r e d i c t e d by Olson i n those c o u n t r i e s , which 
over a l ong , u n i n t e r r u p t e d pe r iod have accumulated scores of 
p r e s s u r e - g r o u p s , e . g . t r a d e u n i o n s . 
I n e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s on the development of b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s a f t e r 
t h e Second World War a s h i f t has been g e n e r a l l y observed from 
i n d u s t r y - w i d e to company ba rga in ing (Deaton and Beaumont, 1980; 
Hendricks and Kahn, 1982) . Some au tho r s have prophes ied the ' w i t h e r i n g 
away' of i ndus t ry -wide ba rga in ing (Brown, 1978) . Among t h e v a r i a b l e s 
e x p l a i n i n g t h i s r e c e n t s h i f t , c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n i n d u s t r y f i g u r e s 
p r o m i n e n t l y . Large companies l eave t h e umbrel la of an i n d u s t r y - w i d e 
b a r g a i n i n g u n i t i n o rde r to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r own wage p o l i c y . If many 
o t h e r c o r p o r a t i o n s fol low s u i t , t he employers ' a s s o c i a t i o n w i l l 
d i s i n t e g r a t e and t r a d e - u n i o n s w i l l have to r e s o r t to company 
ag reemen t s . Also t r a d e - u n i o n s may play an a c t i v e r o l e i n the 
d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of an i n d u s t r y - w i d e b a r g a i n i n g u n i t i f they dec ide to 
c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i r r e s o u r c e s on l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s wi th b e t t e r 
a b i l i t i e s to pay. Therefore the choice between i n d u s t r y and company 
b a r g a i n i n g i s s t r o n g l y r e l a t e d to the mutual s t r a t e g i e s of 
t r a d e - u n i o n s and employers . 
I n t h i s paper we s tudy the impact of the development of l a r g e 
c o r p o r a t i o n s on i n d u s t r y b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s and n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l 
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r e l a t i o n s and r e l a t e th i s impact to s t r a t e g i e s of t rade unions and 
employers. In the analysis a comparative approach wi l l be used. 
F i r s t l y a t t en t i on w i l l be paid to the impact of large corporations on 
bargaining s t ruc tu res of d i f ferent indus t r i e s and on nat ional 
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i ons within the same country. A comparison w i l l be 
made between the Dutch metalworking industry and the Dutch 
non-metalworking i n d u s t r i e s . Secondly we look a t the impact of large 
corporations on bargaining s t ruc tu res of the same industry within 
d i f fe ren t coun t r i e s . In t h i s respect a comparison w i l l be made between 
the Dutch and the B r i t i s h metalworking i n d u s t r i e s . 
In Holland the s t a t e , unions and employers, sponsored the development 
of industry-wide bargaining s trongly in postwar reconstruct ion as an 
e s s e n t i a l tooi of wage pol icy. I t i s an ideal case to study the impact 
of large corporations on a bargaining s t r u c t u r e , with an o r ig ina l ly 
very strong posi t ion for industry-wide bargaining. We w i l l present 
data on the development of number and coverage of bargaining un i t s in 
Dutch metalworking and four other manufacturing indus t r i e s in 1970, 
1977 and 1984 1 ) . I t i s worthwile to point out tha t these data are 
r a the r unique. In most s tud ies , data are l imited to -just number of 
agreements, one year or if more comprehensive, one industfy. 
Over a s imi la r period, 1972-1983, addi t ional data are presented on 
wages ra tes negotiated in bargaining un i t s and actual earings a t 
company l e v e l . 
According to Derber unions and employers in the B r i t i s h metalworking 
industry pioneered industry-wide bargaining (Derber, 19 76) while 
present ly moving towards company bargaining. Based on an e a r l i e r study 
of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i ons in t h i s industry (Huiskamp, 1976) we w i l l pay 
specia l a t t en t i on to a comparison between the Dutch and the B r i t i s h 
^•All agreements and the number of workers covered in Holland, are 
reg i s te red by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. The 
s t a r t of period studied (1970) was dic ta ted by the a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
the data for the f i r s t time in tha t year . The study concentrates on 
the bargaining s t ruc tu re of the manufacturing industry and more 
spec i f ic five indus t r ies are selected for fur ther ana ly s i s . The 
ehemical industry i s chosen as an example of an industry dominated by 
single-employers ' agreements. Three other indus t r ies (Paper, Food, 
drink and tobacco and Timber and furn i tu re ) a re chosen because of' 
t h e i r varied mixed bargaining s t ruc tu res of s i n g l e - and 
multi-employers ' agreements. We chose the engineering industry 
because of i t s share in manufacturing employment and as a good 
metalworking indus t r ies 2 ) . 
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(vervolg noot 1) 
example of an industry dominated by multi-employers ' agreements. The 
se l ec t ion i s representa t ive of bargaining s t ruc tures at industry 
l e v e l . 
^The metalworking indus t r ies in Holland and B r i t a i n were chosen for 
the in te rna t iona l comparison because of the importance of these 
indus t r i e s as p a t t e r n - s e t t e r s in nat ional i n d u s t r i a l r e la t ions and 
because of the work done e a r l i e r on the B r i t i s h metalworking industry 
(Huiskamp, 1976). 
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Developments in bargaining s t ruc tu re are t r a d i t i o n a l l y described in 
terms of multi-employers ' agreements and single-employers ' agreements. 
Empirical data are col lected in terms of number and occasionally 
coverage of three types of bargaining u n i t s : s ing le -p lan t , mul t i -p lan t 
and industry-wide. For the purpose of studying the impact of large 
corporations on bargaining s t ruc tu re t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s not 
prec ise enough. For instance a s ing le -p lan t bargaining uni t may 
r e f l ec t an agreement concluded for a small independent company or a 
subsidiary of a large corporat ion. Also how vd.de i s industry-wide: 
does a bargaining uni t cover a whole industry or ju s t a branch of an 
industry? 
We propose to introducé a new c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of bargaining un i t s from 
an organisa t ional perspec t ive . In doing t h i s we heed Weber's warning 
agains t the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of ' c o l l e c t i v e bargaining s t ruc tu re ( ••• ) 
with any simplified notion of the bargaining u n i t ' (Weber, 1967, 14) . 
In order to s t r e s s the r e l a t ionsh ip between bargaining un i t s and 
s t r a t e g i e s of t he i r const i tuent organisat ions we look a t bargaining 
u n i t s as the expression of in te ro rgan i sa t iona l r e l a t ions between 
unions and employers (Kochan, 1985; Lammers, 1981). 
In the case of multi-employers ' agreements i t concerns 
in t e ro rgan i sa t iona l r e l a t ionsh ips between unions and employers' 
a s soc i a t i ons . These do not necessar i ly coincide with an industry as 
defined in the economical and s t a t i s t i c a l terms of i n d u s t r i a l 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . The metalworking industry i s a prime example of t h i s . 
The industry comprises many d i s t i n c t branches, even to the extent tha t 
many observerers speak in terms of ' s epa ra t e and d i s t i n c t i n d u s t r i e s ' 
(Derber, 1976, 20) . Some authors conclude from t h i s t ha t the i den t i t y 
of the engineering industry can only be found f i r s t l y in the 
membership of employers to an employers' federat ion and of the workers 
to ce r t a in trade-ui ions and secondly in the r e l a t ions between the 
employers' federat ion and the unions concerned (Lerner, 19 62, 16) . 
We have been able to c lass i fy our data on multi-employers' agreements 
a.ccording to the>various degrees in which the in te ro rgan i sa t iona l 
r e l a t i o n s concerned cover an indust ry . An industry-wide bargaining 
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un i t covers a whole industry , whereas a single-branch bargaining uni t 
covers a branch pr.oducing a f a i r l y homogeneous product. In between, 
there are multi-branch bargaining un i t s covering several branches of 
the same indus t ry . In t h i s way the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the bargaining 
u n i t s r e f l e c t s the number of d i s t i n c t markets covered by the u n i t . 
This c l a s s i f i c a t i o n makes i t possible to observe changes within 
multi-employer agreements: i s there a development towards or away from 
industry-wide bargaining? 
I t was also possible to c lass i fy our mater ia l on single-employer 
agreements from an organisat ional perspec t ive . In t h i s case i t 
concerns in te rorgan isa t iona l r e l a t ions between unions and one firm. 
We have marked them in terms of the following typology: corporat ion or 
d iv i s ion , Dutch owned subsidiary, foreign owned subsidiary and small 
independent firms -*). 
Loveridge has s ta ted tha t the study of single-employer agreements in 
terms of s i ng l e - or muit i - p l an t , has obscured changes in ownership of 
firms and we add i t s organisat ional consequences ' i n any of the 
analys is of i ndus t r i a l r e l a t i o n s ' (Loveridge, 1983, 17 6) . Our new 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n allows us to observe changes within single-employer 
agreements, which r e f l ec t j u s t t ha t : i s an increase in the number of 
single-employer agreements re la ted to small companies or to large 
corporations es tabl ishing t he i r own bargaining unit? Are agreements 
decreasing in number as a r e su l t of bargaining being increasingly 
car r ied out a t a corporate level? 
As said before, the in te rorgan isa t iona l perspective i s introduced in 
order to extend the analysis beyond co l l ec t ive bargaining un i t s as 
such. 
F i r s t of a l l , bargaining un i t s only re f lec t formal bargaining 
s t r u c t u r e s . A company or i t s workers may determine (part of) t h e i r own 
wages, without es tabl ishing a formal bargaining u n i t . They may do 
e i the so in contravention of or in accordance with the rules 
es tabl i shed by the const i tuent pa r t i e s to the agreement. 
Differences between negotiated wages ra tes and actual earnings wi l l 
^The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of single-employers ' agreements i s based on a 
empirical study of Koot of the concentration in Dutch manufacturing 
industry during the s i x t i e s and seventies (Koot, 1978). 
provide some evidence for the degree inwhich unions and employers' 
assoc ia t ions are able or wi l l ing to make these ru les binding and 
enforcable among the i r members( 'organisat ions) . 
Secondly, we wi l l also look a t the organisat ions themselves, as 
cons t i tuent members of the in te ro rgan i sa t iona l r e l a t i o n s . Employers 
have a decisive influence on thè bargaining s t r u c t u r e . They have to 
decide on both the decision-making s t r c t u r e s in a Corporation and the 
establishment of employers' a s soc i a t i ons . The employér may decide in 
order to control labour costs to i n t e g r a t e subsidiary bargaining un i t s 
in to a corporate bargaining u n i t . Unions may s t imulate such a 
development, because i t may help them in t he i r e f fo r t s to c e n t r a l i s e 
t h e i r own organisa t ional s t ruc tu re or because i t may cause terms and 
condit ions to be equalized to those of the be t t e r paying 
s u b s i d i a r i e s . 
So, union po l ic ies and organisa t ional s t ruc tu res are re levan t . I s 
t h e i r membership based on p a r t i c u l a r indus t r i es or on sections of 
workers within d i f ferent indus t r ies? What i s the pos i t ion of lay 
o f f i c i a l s a t company level? 
The wage policy pursued i s of utmost importance: i s the wage policy 
s o l i d a r i s t i c , embracing a l l workers in an industry or s ec t i ona l , 
d i rec ted to ce r t a in groups of workers or sect ions of an industry? 
There could also be a tendency of agreements within one industry being 
(vervolg noot 3) 
Instead of the t r a d i t i o n a l study of concentrat ion r a t i o s in 
i ndus t r i e s he opted for a d i s t i n c t i o n between corporat ions , 
d iv i s ions , semi-dependent subs id i a r i e s , dependent subs id ia r ies and 
small independent f irms. The c r i t e r i a for Classifying companies on 
t h i s scale were: ownership, the presence of management functions 
(such as s a l e s , product development e t c . ) and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a 
company to influence market behaviour of other companies in one or 
two i n d u s t r i e s . 
I t was not possible to c lass i fy our agreements in the five categories 
of companies as defined by Koot. I t was however possible to 
d i s t ingu i sh between agreements of corporations and d iv i s ions , 
agreements of subs id iar ies and agreements of small independent f irms. 
Agreements of subs id iar ies could be c l a s s i f i ed as being e i t h e r of 
Dutch or foreign ownership. Foreign owned divis ions are c l a s s i f i ed 
under corpora te /d iv is iona l agreements. I t concerns large Dutch 
corporat ions taken over by foreign companies, but s t i l l to be 
regarded as corporations in the terms as defined by Koot. 
By and large most company/divisional agreements are muit i -p lan t and 
most subsidiary or small firms agreements are s ing le -p l an t . 
i n t e r l inked because one union or set of unions coordinate t he i r wage 
po l i c i e s in di f ferent bargaining u n i t s or perhaps the agreements are 
in te r l inked in terms of p a t t e r n - s e t t e r s and pa t te rn- fo l lowers . These 
l inkages , mainly depending on trade-union organisat ion, may involve 
bargaining un i t s of several i n d u s t r i e s . Such a coherent se t of 
bargaining un i t s i s called a bargaining domain. 
The conceptual framework developed in t h i s paragraph can be visual ised 
i n a simple model. Variables such as the pa r t i cu l a r 
i n d u s t r y ( - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) , concentrat ion of ownership and bargaining 
domains are s i tua ted in an ' ou t e r l aye r ' and influence the ü 
in te ro rgan i sa t iona l r e l a t i o n s , shaping a h i s t o r i c a l context for 
trade-union and employers' s t r a t e g i e s . Those s t r a t eg i e s in t he i r turn 
influence each other as well as var iables such as concentrat ion of 
ownership and the bounderies of bargaining domains. However, i f we 
take a c loser look and journey into the ' c o r e ' of the model, we also 
find that those const i tuent organisat ions through var iables such as 
wage policy and the decision-making process of large corporations 
shape the in te rorgan isa t iona l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Within the Dutch case we 
w i l l mainly concentrate on analysing the ' o u t e r l a y e r ' , whereas the 
' c o r e ' w i l l be examined in de t a i l in the Dutch/Bri t i sh comparison. 
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COMPARISON BETWEEN DUTCH METALWORKING AND NON-METALWORKING INDUSTRIES 
I n h i s s tudy of Dutch i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s Windmuller has i d e n t i f i e d 
t h r e e c e n t r a l ha l lmarks i n pos t -war Dutch i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s (Windmuller, 1969, 434-441) . These a r e the g r e a t importance 
a t t a c h e d to c o n s u l t a t i o n , t he c e n t r a l i s e d n a t u r e of the i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s and the c r u c i a l r o l played by the government. C o n s u l t a t i o n 
i n Dutch i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i s a broad concept and has a wider 
meaning than j u s t c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . At t h e n a t i o n a l l e v e l i t 
o f t e n r e s u l t s i n n a t i o n a l agreements or gu id ing p r i n c i p l e s f o r 
c o l l e c t i v e ba rga in ing a t i n d u s t r y or company l e v e l . In t h e s e 
c o n s u l t a t i o n s the government p l ays a c r u c i a l r o l e and e s p e c i a l l y 
dur ing the pos t -war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n pe r iod the government s t i m u i a t e d 
t h e c o n c l u s i o n of mult i -employ 'er ag reemen t s . These agreements could be 
made l e g a l l y b ind ing for a l l employees working i n t h e i n d u s t r y covered 
by the agreement . In comparison wi th the pre-war s i t u a t i o n , pos t -war 
mu l t i - employe r agreements augmented i n number and coverage up to t h e 
e a r l y s i x t i e s . There a f t e r t h e r e was a merger wave i n i n d u s t r y , which 
peaked a t t he ënd of the decade . 
Number and coverage of ba rga in ing u n i t s 
The developments i n the metalworking i n d u s t r y w i l l be compared wi th 
developments i n the four s e l e c t e d i n d u s t r i e s i n terms of number and 
coverage of ba rga in ing u n i t s . The r e s u l t s a r e p re sen ted i n t a b l e 1 . 
Between 1970 and 1984 t h e number and coverage of b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s 
formed by smal l f i rms decreased i n n e a r l y a l l s e l e c t e d i n d u s t r i e s . 
Already i n 1977, t h e i r r o l e i n t h e ba rga in ing s t r u c t u r e i s of margina l 
i m p o r t a n c e . Notable i s the i n c r e a s e of ba rga in ing u n i t s e s t a b l i s h e d by 
c o r p o r a t i o n s and d i v i s i o n s , perhaps not so much i n numbers as i n 
c o v e r a g e . In the metalworking i n d u s t r y t h e r e i s not much change s i n c e 
1970, but i n a l l o t h e r i n d u s t r i e s ( excep t t imber and f u r n i t u r e ) t h e 
impor tance of the c o r p o r a t e / d i v i s i o n a l b a r g a i n i n g u n i t has i n c r e a s e d . 
The number of Dutch owned s u b s i d i a r y b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s i n the 
metalworking i n d u s t r y i s n e g l i b l e s m a l l , i n a l l t he o t h e r i n d u s t r i e s 
( excep t paper ) t h e r e has been a c o n s i d e r a b l e d e c r e a s e . Bargaining 
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u n i t s es tabl ished by foreign owned subs id ia r ies are c lea r ly on the 
inc rease , but again t h i s i s not re f lec ted in the metalworking 
indus t ry . 
Looking at the development of multi-employer agreements i t i s evident 
t ha t again there are large differences between the metalworking and 
the other i n d u s t r i e s . The metalworking industry i s the only industry 
with an industry-wide bargaining u n i t . In one industry (paper) only 
single-branch bargaining un i t s are in ex is tence . In the three other 
i ndus t r i e s during the period 1970-1977 the decrease in number and 
coverage of multi-branche bargaining un i t s seems to be l e s s than among 
the s ingle-branch. However, between 1977 and 1984 the coverage of 
multi-branch bargaining un i t s also diminished s t rongly . 
As to former Dutch owned subsidiary bargaining u n i t s , i t i s found that 
they have been integrated in to corpora te /d iv is iona l bargaining u n i t s . 
The same process occurred in the case of small firms if they are 
overtaken by other companies. The growth of coverage by 
corpora te /d iv i s iona l bargaining un i t s does not exclusively or ig ina tes 
from t h i s process of i n t eg ra t i on . Some corpora te /d iv i s iona l bargaining 
u n i t s have increased the numbers of workers covered because of the 
i n t eg ra t i on of two of those un i t s in the wake of a merger. In some 
ins tances a Corporation has decided to conclude i t s own agreement 
during the period s tudied . 
Of the former single-branch bargaining un i t s some were dissolved, but 
most of them were integrated or merged into multi-branch or indust ry-
wide bargaining u n i t s . This trend becomes even more v i s i b l e if we take 
a look at the years before 1970, which we could do only for the 
multi-employer agreements. The r e s u l t s are presented in table 2 . The 
bargaining s t ruc tu re of the paper industry i s a notable exception as 
none of the single-branch bargaining un i t s have merged in e i t h e r a 
multi-branch or industry wide bargaining u n i t . In the metalworking 
industry not only s ing le , but also multi-branch bargaining un i t s were 
in tegra ted in the industry-wide bargaining u n i t s . 
In the metalworking industry and the non-metalworking indus t r i es 
together there i s one c lear t rend: smaller bargaining un i t s have 
e i t h e r been fused or integrated into new or exis t ing bargaining u n i t s . 
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Some have even disappeared. This trend equally occurs among s i n g l e -
and multi-employer agreements, even in instances where only a few 
agreements are present : among the multi-employer agreements in the 
chemical industry and the single-employer agreements in engineering. 
However, in t h i s respect there are two notable d i f ferences . F i r s t l y , 
i n metalworking the in tegra t ion of bargaining un i t s had already come 
to an end before the period we study. The second difference concerns 
the size of the bargaining u n i t s . The bargaining un i t s in the 
engineering industry are considerably l a rge r than those in the 
non-metalworking industry, even a f t e r the process of in tegra t ion in 
the l a t t e r . There are bas ica l ly three large bargaining un i t s in t h i s 
indus t ry . These three are the huge (coverage 77.000) corporate 
bargaining uni t of P h i l i p s , and two industry-wide u n i t s , one for 
a r t i s a n establishments and one for i n d u s t r i a l es tabl isments . With the 
one exception of P h i l i p s , no other large corporations have establ ished 
t h e i r bargaining uni t in t h i s indust ry . I t i s time to leave the purely 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l level of regis tered bargaining un i t s and examine the 
negotiated wage ra tes and actual earnings at company l e v e l . 
Changes in the rules of agreements 
Most multi-employer agreements in the non-metalworking industry are 
Standard agreements. In the case of a Standard agreement, the r e l a t i ve 
change in the negotiated wage ra tes s t r i c t l y applies to a l l wages 
under the agreement. Companies are not allowed to go above ne i ther pay 
l e s s or more than increases s e t t l ed on. 
In the metalworking industry the agreement for i ndus t r i a l e s t a b l i s h -
ments are formulated in terms of a minimum agreement. This means that 
under the agreement, companies are allowed to pay more but not l e s s 
than the agreed change in the wage r a t e . 
In table 3 increases in negotiated wage ra tes and earnings over the 
period 1972-1983 are presented for the metalworking industry and three 
of the selected non-metalworking i n d u s t r i e s . The difference between 
earnings and wage ra tes i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y explained in terms of wage 
d r i f t . In t h i s instance wage d r i f t i s not only corrected for overtime, 
but also for changes in the composition of the labour force (age, 
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s k i l l and sex) and of the indus t ry . Wage d r i f t minus t h i s ' s t r u c t u r a l ' 
d r i f t provides us with an indica tor of ' p u r e ' d r i f t . 
If we compare the i ndus t r i e s , we not ice the following. 'Pure ' d r i f t in 
the metalworking industry i s the same as in the chemical industry , but 
there i s a sharp cont ras t with 'Food, drink and tobacco' and with 
'Timber and f u r n i t u r e ' . 'Pure ' d r i f t i s neg l ig ib le in the l a t t e r two 
indus t r i e s and even negat ive . In other words, there are no addi t ional 
increases to negiot ia ted wage ra tes a t company leve l other than j u s t 
' s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t ' . At the same time in these indus t r i es the increase 
i n the negotiated wage ra tes are much higher than in 'Chemicals' and 
'Metalworking' . There seems to be a c lear co r re l a t ion between the 
l eve l of negotiated wage ra tes and 'pure ' d r i f t . The more wage ra t e s 
increase , the smaller ' pu re ' d r i f t appears to be. How i s t h i s to be 
explained? 
In Standard agreements, unions negot ia te r e l a t i v e l y high wage ra tes as 
a t company level no increases are allowed to occur. In a minimum 
agreement unions can afford to bargain for a r e l a t i v e l y low increase , 
because under the rules of the agreement a fresh round of negotiat ions 
i s allowed to take place a t company l e v e l . 
Companies in Food, drink and tobacco and in Timber and furn i ture seem 
to follow the rules formulated by unions and employers' federat ions 
very p rec i se ly . There are indicat ions tha t a number of small firms pay 
below the negotiated r a t e s . 
The chemical industry, where single-employer agreements prevai l we did 
not expect an earningsgap to occur. However, the o i l and other 
chemical companies are concentrated in the Rotterdam area, where the 
Shell-agreement i s leading. Many of the neighbouring firms r a i s e 
without any formal agreement t he i r r a t e s ju s t above the ra tes agreed 
by She l l . In t h i s way, the corporate agreement of Shell functions l ike 
a minimum agreement in the bargaining domain of the process indust ry . 
A cbange of the engineering agreement from a Standard in to a minimum 
agreement took place during the second half of the s i x t i e s because of 
the growing need of the mostly l a rger companies to e s t ab ï i sh t he i r own 
wages and conditions (De Jong, 1975). In the bargaining s t ruc tu re of 
t h i s industry we have not witnessed an increase in 
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corpora te /d iv i s iona l and foreign-owned subsidiary bargaining un i t s 
over the period studied as large companies have been capable of 
determining part of t he i r own wage conditions without breaking away 
from the industry-wide bargaining u n i t . A process of accommodation 
occurred through a change in the rules governing co l lec t ive 
bargaining. 
Cent ra l i sa t ion in bargaining s t ruc tu re and nat ional i ndus t r i a l 
r e l a t i ons 
Unions, government and employers' assoc ia t ions i n the Netherlands 
fostered the development of multi-employer agreements af t e r the war. 
Some of these agreements have developed into centra l ized bargaining 
u n i t s , gobbling up smaller agreements. The increase in company 
bargaining has not caused a rupture in Dutch i ndus t r i a l r e la t ions as 
the formation of large corporations neat ly f i t t e d in with nat ional 
i n d u s t r i a l r e la t ions fea tures : the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of many 
single-employer agreements into the corpora te /d iv is iona l bargaining 
u n i t s . 
This in tegra t ion r e f l e c t s the organisa t ional process of upgrading and* 
downgrading within corporations as described by Koot (Koot, 1978). 
Studying corporate s t ruc tu re in the nineteen s i x t i e s and seventies in 
the Dutch manufacturing industry he depicted two developments, 
represent ing the same phenomenon. The f i r s t was the development of 
firms into corporations or divis ions with e i t he r control of ownershlp 
or the presence of management functions and the p o s s i b i l i t y to 
influence market behaviour. I t i s a process of promotion on the 
corporate ' l a d d e r ' . The second was a process of downgrading by firms 
f i r s t los ing the i r control over ownership and in due course also most 
managerial functions, ending up as a mere product ion f a c i l i t y : a 
degradation via an independent subsidiary into a dependent subsidiary . 
Somé firms kept control over t he i r ownership and t he i r management 
funct ions, but being mostly small, could not influence market 
behaviour. Along with functions such as research and development and 
marketing, some years a f te r a take-over, loca l management l o s t to 
cen t r a l management i t s power to conclude co l lec t ive agreements. This 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of decision-making had been i n i t i a t e d by management, 
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although, unions could play a c ruc ia l role in i t . In a study of large 
corporations in Holland and Western Germany, carr ied out in the 
seven t i es , Bomers found that unions favoured bargaining a t corporate 
l eve l in home-based mult inat ionals and a t subsidiary level in 
foreign-based mult inat ionals (Bomers, 1976, p. 128-139). Indeed our 
data show an increase in both corpora te /d iv i s iona l and foreign-owned 
subsidiary bargaining u n i t s . Obviously unions looked for the best 
p o s s i b i l i t y to exert influence on corporate decision-making i n t h e i r 
home-land. 
In the metalworking indust ry , with the notable exeption of P h i l i p s , 
the existence of corporations has not lead to the establishment of 
corporate bargaining un i t s a t any s c a l e . Ins tead, the unions and the 
employers' a ssoc ia t ion concerned agreed on a second wage round a t 
company l e v e l . In the other selected indus t r ies the presence of 
corpora te /d iv i s iona l bargaining un i t s seems to r e l a t e to the absence 
of a cen t ra l i sed industry-wide bargaining uni t as ex i s t s in 
engineering. In t h i s respect i t i s very important whether an industry 
cons t i t u t e s a bargaining domain in l t s own r i g h t such as the 
metalworking industry or i s part of a bargaining domain together with 
other i n d u s t r i e s . The paper industry i s part of the bargaining domain 
of the pr in t ing indust ry . In the pr in t ing industry single-employer 
agreements are t o t a l l y absent and the bargaining s t ruc tu re has been 
dominated from a very early point in i t s h i s tory by an industry-wide 
bargaining u n i t . This agreement in the pr in t ing industry ac t s as wage 
leader and with only single-branch bargaining un i t s in the paper 
indus t ry , room i s l e f t for the establishment of corpora te /d iv is iona l 
bargaining u n i t s . A s imi lar process occurred in 'Timber and 
f u r n i t u r e ' , being linked up with the building indus t ry . 
If the bargaining s t ruc tu re of an industry i s part of a wider 
bargaining domain, i t s multi-employer agreements are prevented from 
ieveloping into an industry-wide bargaining u n i t . This, in turn , leads 
to a ' n i c h e ' for corpora te /d iv is iona l bargaining u n i t s . 
In the chemical industry, being part of the bargaining domain of the 
process industry , the development of any multi-employers agreement was 
stopped a t an ear ly s tage , as the post-war expansion of t h i s industry 
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coincided with the concentration of ownership. Corporate/divisional 
and foreign-owned subsidiary bargalning un i t s were es tabl ished before 
the in te rorgan isa t iona l r e l a t ions between unions and employers' 
assoc ia t ions were developed a t any s ca l e . If such r e l a t ions do not 
cover a whole industry before the concentrat ion of ownership occurs at 
a large sca le , then the establishment of corporate un i t s i s l i ke ly to 
take p lace . 
In the food, drink and tobacco industry no industry-wide agreement 
came into ex is tence . This industry i s very heterogeneous, more than 
the other indus t r ies studied ( there i s no common raw m a t e r i a l ) . Some 
branches of th i s industry are only covered by multi-employer 
agreements and others only by single-employer agreements. But again, 
our arguments about concentration and in te rorgan isa t iona l r e l a t ions 
between unions and employers are also val id on the level of 
branches *>. 
The process of concentration does not necessar i ly lead to the 
establishment of parent companies i n an industry . We have mentioned 
the process of up-grading and down-grading a t company l e v e l . There i s , 
however, no reason why such process should not occur a t industry, or , 
more l i k e l y , a t branch l e v e l . 
I t i s qui te possible that whole branches of an industry consis t of 
down-degraded subs id i a r i e s . A parent company may never have been 
es tabl i shed in such a branch and the multi-employer agreement may 
never have been challenged. Indeed, many subs id iar ies of corporations 
a re s t i l l covered by multi-employer agreements. 
A l a s t remark concerning the formation of large corporations refers to 
the process of deconcentration of ownership or decen t ra l i sa t ion of 
decision-making. Especial ly in the paper industry and in the timber 
and furn i ture industry, some large corporations went bankrupt a f te r 
1977. Most of the subs id iar ies were taken over by other (foreign) 
corporations and some of them became small independent companies 
again. In both indus t r ies our c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of bargaining un i t s makes 
i t possible to t racé th i s process. Between 19 77 and 1984 there i s an 
^Take for instance the tobacco-industry. This industry consis ts out of 
two branches: c igars and c i g a r e t t e s , both completely foreign-owned. 
However, in the c igar- indust ry small companies were taken over and 
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increase in foreign-owned subsidiary bargaining un i t s and some 
revers ion to small company bargaining u n i t s . According to our data on 
1984 there i s as yet no tendency in large corporations towards a 
renewed autonomy for local management. 
The conclusion i s that large corporations have had a c lear impact on 
Dutch bargaining s t r u c t u r e . At industry leve l the re la t ionsh ip between 
mul t i - and single-employer agreements i s s t i l l qui te varied and 
complex because of differences in the development of 
in te ro rgan i sa t iona l r e l a t ions between unions and employers, 
differences in the process of concentrat ion and in the re la t ionsh ips 
between those two processes in t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l development. 
Nevertheless, management and unions have shown in a l l indus t r ies and 
corporations a remarkable consistency in t he i r s t ra tegy to e s t ab l i sh 
company bargaining u n i t s : the development of integrated and 
concentrated bargaining u n i t s , r e f l ec t ing organisa t ional processes, 
both within corporations and trade unions. Integrated and 
comprehensive multi-employer agreements co-exis t with s imi lar 
single-employer agreements. 
The c e n t r a l i s a t i o n in bargaining s t ruc tu re has led to an intermediate 
leve l of large bargaining-uni ts which have become the foei of Dutch 
na t iona l i ndus t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . One could even wonder whether the se t s 
of in te ro rgan i sa t iona l r e l a t ions around these t r endse t t e r s have not 
replaced the Dutch nat ional i ndus t r i a l r e l a t i ons system as such * ) . j n 
studying the impact of large corporations in di f ferent indus t r ies 
within the same country, we have come accros the importance of trade 
union and employers' s t r a t e g i e s . By comparing the same (metalworking) 
industry in two different count r ies , Holland and Br i t a in , the 
a t t e n t i o n w i l l be focussed on those s t r a t e g i e s . 
(vervolg noot 4) 
developed into degraded subs id i a r i e s , while in the c iga re t t e - indus t ry 
Dutch corporations were taken over a t a l a t e r stage and s t i l l have a 
measure of independence. The in te ro rgan i sa t iona l r e la t ions between 
unions and the employers' a ssoc ia t ion stem from a very early date and 
only covered the c igar - indus t ry , while in the c iga re t t e - indus t ry no 
such r e l a t ions came into existence before the concentrat ion of 
ownership occurred. 
->In t h i s sense we also feel tha t methodologically a systems approach 
of i ndus t r i a l r e l a t ions has to be replaced by an in te rorgan isa t iona l 
approach. 
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COMPARISON BETWEEN DUTCH AND BRITISH METALWORKING INDUSTRIES 
According to Derber i n h i s comparison of the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n 
t h e metalworking i n d u s t r i e s i n f ive c o u n t r i e s the B r i t i s h i n d u s t r y 
p ioneered t h e development of i n d u s t r y - w i d e b a r g a i n i n g . When making a 
comparison between the ba rga in ing s t r u c t u r e s of Dutch and B r i t i s h 
e n g i n e e r i n g , we run i n t o some d i f f i c u l t i e s , which a r e e s s e n t i a l f o r 
t h e unde r s t and ing of the s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e two 
metalworking i n d u s t r i e s . For Holland we could compare the formal 
b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e i n the metalworking w i t h those i n the 
non-metalworking i n d u s t r i e s , as i n a l l i n d u s t r i e s most ba rga in ing 
u n i t s a r e formal ly e s t a b l i s h e d and the r e s u l t s of the ba rga in ing 
p r o c e s s a r e g e n e r a l l y app l i ed i n the companies under the agreement . 
I n B r i t a i n hbwever, such a p roces s of f o r m a l i s a t i o n and 
s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n i n c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g does not e x i s t a t t h i s s c a l e 
i n the eng inee r ing i n d u s t r y . There has always been a t e n s i o n between 
b a r g a i n i n g a t c e n t r a l l e v e l and a t l o c a l l e v e l . At the e a r l i e r s t a g e s 
of the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n t h e metalworking i n d u s t r y , t h i s t e n s i o n 
was r e f l e c t e d by n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r y b a r g a i n i n g v e r s u s r e g i o n a l d i s t r i c t 
b a r g a i n i n g . Bargaining above t h e l e v e l of the company o r i g i n a l l y took 
p l a c e a t d i s t r i c t l e v e l . For a s h o r t p e r i o d , to beg in w i th t h e F i r s t 
World War, i n d u s t r y ba rga in ing appeared to become the dominant mode of 
wage d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Sho r t l y be fo re and e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r World War I I 
company ba rga in ing developed r a t h e r qu ick ly (Huiskamp, 1976) . As such, 
t h e t e n s i o n between c e n t r a l and l o c a l ba rga in ing was r e f l e c t e d through 
i n d u s t r y b a r g a i n i n g v e r s u s company b a r g a i n i n g and a t a l a t e r s t age 
a l s o wi-thin companies between c o r p o r a t e / d i v i s i o n a l ba rga in ing and 
p l a n t b a r g a i n i n g . 
As a consequence of l o c a l ba rga in ing being t r a n s f e r r e d from d i s t r i c t 
t o company and e s p e c i a l l y p l a n t l e v e l , i n d u s t r y - w i d e ba rga in ing only 
l e d to minimum agreements concerning wages and c o n d i t i o n s . The 
b a r g a i n i n g p a t t e r n was i r r e g u l a r , meet ings took p lace only when deemed 
n e c e s s a r y . One wonders whether one could speak of a ba rga in ing u n i t 
w i t h a s e t of p rocedura l r u l e s and s u b s t a n t i a l outcomes app l i ed i n 
most companies under t h e agreement as i n Dutch e n g i n e e r i n g . I f B r i t i s h 
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engineering did ever pioneer industry-wide bargaining i t ce r t a in ly did 
not so in terms of the establishment of formal bargaining u n i t s . 
In recent years especia l ly during the nineteen s i x t i e s and seventies 
the proportion of Standard earnings accounted for by the ra tes 
negotiated in the industry agreement d r a s t i c a l l y dropped. Increases 
were agreed on in company bargaining by shop stewards. Without the 
formal establishment of company bargaining u n i t s , a 'doublé ' 
bargaining s t ruc tu re came in to operat ion: a t industry level and at 
company l e v e l . 
Especial ly large corporations broke away from the industry agreement 
and es tabl ished t he i r own annual agreement. In order to prevent the 
ex t inc t ion of the industry-wide agreement, the unions and the 
employers' federat ion agreed .on a new var ian t of the minimum 
agreement. In t h i s new var ian t the minimum does not function as a 
' f l o o r ' giving r i s e to a second wage round a t company level but as a 
' sa fe ty n e t ' . In a minimum agreement workers receiving more than the 
minimum r a t e have t he i r wages increased in such a way that par i ty 
between t h e i r company ra tes and the industry ra tes i s a t l e a s t 
r e - e s t a b l i s h e d . The ' f l o o r ' r a i s e s everybody standing on i t . 
Under the minimum ' sa fe ty ne t ' agreement the change in the industry 
wage r a t e applies only to those companies in the industry whose 
workers are paid the minimum (Brown, 1978). In t h i s way, there i s no 
automatie l ink between the industry r a t e and the company r a t e . 
Management has more freedom to e s t ab l i sh the i r own wages. The industry 
agreement functions as a ' s a fe ty n e t ' : companies wi l l drop into the 
n e t , if i t s wages have come down to the minimum. 
Brown has documented t h i s change in the B r i t i s h metalworking industry, 
however more recent ly E l l i o t has s ta ted tha t the industry agreement in 
t h i s industry i s moving back from a ' s a fe ty ne t ' to a ' f l o o r ' 
po s i t i on . Workers, due to the weakening of t he i r domestic bargaining 
pos i t ions in the wake of the economie c r i s e s , t ry to base t h e i r 
increases again on and above increases in the industry ra tes 
( E l l i o t , 1981). 
Changes in the bargaining s t ruc tu re are not r e s t r i c t e d to changes in 
the re la t ionsh ip between company and industry bargaining, but also 
occur within company bargaining. Because of reforms mainly induced by 
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management, bargaining has moved in some companies from 
subs id i a ry - (p l an t - ) l eve l to d iv i s iona l or corporate l e v e l . In other 
companies t h i s i s not the case. Studylng large corporations in Br i t i sh 
engineering, Loveridge has s t ressed ' t h e longevity of the ( . . . ) 
federal corporate s t r u c t u r e ' in cont ras t to ' corpora te central ism' i n 
other countries (Loveridge, 1983, p . 191). 
Whereas the industry agreement i n B r i t i s h metalworking has taken a 
pos i t ion between a minimum ' f l o o r ' agreement and a minimum ' sa fe ty 
n e t ' agreement, the Dutch engineering agreement hovers between a 
Standard agreement and a minimum ' f l o o r ' agreement. If addi t ional 
negot ia t ions in Dutch engineering companies take place at a l l , they 
are carr ied out within a deta i led set of procedural rules la id down in 
the industry agreement. Increases above industry ra tes are very 
prec ise ly determined by domestic job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n schemes which are 
not bas ica l ly d i f ferent from the scheme in the multi-employer 
agreement. The domestic increases are negotiated between the company 
and the na t ional ( regional) fu l l - t ime union o f f i c i a l s with shop 
stewards e i t he r not being present at the negot iat ions or attending 
only as observers . 
Union and employers' s t r a t e g i e s 
In comparing the bargaining s t r uc tu r e s , we observe more company 
bargaining un i t s and more plant bargaining in B r i t i s h than in Dutch 
metalworking. Both indus t r ies are covered by an industry-wide 
bargaining u n i t . The way however in which the ru l e s , agreed to by the 
p a r t i e s , are applied in the companies d i f f e r s . In Holland unions and 
employers' federat ion e i the r enforce the rules or the procedures for 
' dev ia t ion ' from these rules are s t r i c t l y formulated. In the UK the 
ru les are ne i ther s t r i c t l y applied nor extended for special 
appl ica t ion a t plant l e v e l . 
Metalworking indus t r ies share in t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l development many 
commonalities in t he i r technical-economic s t ruc tu re , such as the 
work-process, the composition of the labour force, the raw mater ia ls 
and labour-capi ta l r a t i o ' s . Nevertheless, the industry i s very 
heterogeneous in i t s product markets and there have always been large 
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differences between growth sectors and stagnating sectors with 
d i f fe ren t a b i l i t i e s to pay wages. Indeed the industry i s of ten defined 
in terms of the in te rorgan isa t iona l r e l a t ionsh ips between trade unions 
and the employers' a s soc ia t ion . As these cons t i t u t e a bargaining 
domain in t h e i r own r i g h t , we are in a pos i t ion to compare 
in t e ro rgan i sa t iona l r e l a t i o n ra the r than i n d u s t r i e s . In both 
indus t r i e s one set of in te rorgan isa t iona l r e l a t ionsh ips covered a 
subs t an t i a l part of the industry before the concentrat ion of ownership 
occurred. 
Within t h i s h i s t o r i c a l context, looking a t the s t r a t e g i e s of the 
cons t i tuent organisa t ions , i t i s of c ruc ia l importance whether or not 
the trade unions favour uniform wages r a t e s . I s there an emphasis on 
the pro tec t ion of the lower paid, r e s t r a in ing members in t he i r demands 
i n the companies with a b e t t e r a b i l i t y to pay? An industry-wide 
agreement i s a be t t e r instrument for comprehensive, s o l i d a r i s t i c wage 
pol icy than a single-employer agreement. A minimum agreement acting as 
a ' sa fe ty n e t ' , does allow for la rger var ia t ions in wages between 
members in d i f ferent f irms. If the industry agreement i s pushed in to a 
marginal r o l e , lower paid workers, espec ia l ly those in small firms, 
w i l l get off worse. 
In Dutch unions the bargaining function has been monopolised by the 
fu i l - t ime o f f i c i a l s ; t h i s i s very prec ise ly la id down in the rules and 
organisa t ional s t ruc tu re of the unions. In B r i t i s h unions 
plant bargaining by l ay -o f f i c i a l s has occurred for a long time and 
t h i s has a lso been supported by important sect ions of the paid 
o f f i c i a l s . In t h i s respect there are also important differences within 
unions. For ins tance , in the B r i t i s h engineering union (AEUW) the 
' r i g h t wing' i s in favour of a more s o l i d a r i s t i c wage policy, while 
the ' l e f t wing' i s in favour of bargaining in the stronger sectors and 
p l an t s of the indus t ry . Especial ly the metalworking industry 
- heterogeneous, but covered by one set of in te rorgan isa t iona l 
r e l a t i o n s - offers many opportuni t ies for sec t ional bargaining. The 
unions ' s t ra tegy i s the outcome of the posi t ion of both 'wings' i n the 
decision-making processes . While in B r i t a i n the ' l e f t wing' was 
dominant in the s i x t i e s and sevent ies , in Holland the s o l i d a r i s t i c 
policy holds the majority in the unions. 
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For th i s reason, from the beginning of th i s century, the 
organisa t iona l s t ruc tu re of the unions did not allow for an 
independent posi t ion of shop stewards. Whether such a formal 
organisa t ional s t ruc tu re w i l l be maintained depends very much on the 
s t r a t e g i e s of the employers' f edera t ion . Does the employers' 
federa t ion prefer to negot ia te with paid o f f i c i a l s or are they in 
favour of recognizing lay o f f i c i a l s? I s the employers' federat ion 
concerned with a Standard wage r a t e throughout the industry? 
H i s to r i ca l l y in the Netherlands they have concentrated on a Standard 
wage r a t e to be negotiated with paid o f f i c i a l s and to be applied a t 
company l e v e l . This s t ra tegy has beelümore d i f f i cu l t to implement in 
the s i x t i e s and sevent ies , because of the increasing differences 
between large corporations and small companies. These differences also 
became stronger and stronger in the B r i t i s h Engineering Employers' 
Federation and has resul ted - l i k e in Dutch metalworking, but to a 
g rea t e r degree - in a fur ther re laxa t ion of the rules of the industry 
agreement. 
The development of corporations adds in the f i r s t instance to 
decen t r a l i s a t ion in the bargaining s t r u c t u r e , but the development of 
t h e i r own, in t e rna l organisa t ional s t ruc ture ac t s in the second 
ins tance as a force towards c e n t r a l i s a t i o n . However, whereas in 
Holland both management and union o f f i c i a l s i n i a t e and st imulate t h i s 
process , in the United Kingdom due to the organisa t ional s t ruc tu re of 
trade unions ( the posi t ion of shop stewards a t p l an t - l eve l ) and of 
companies (management a t p l an t - l eve l ) t h i s process of c en t r a l i s a t i on 
i s more haphazard " ) . 
° I t i s also possible that there are differences between Dutch and 
B r i t i s h managers such as found between German and B r i t i s h managers. 
German managers used the i r d iscre t ionary powers l ess than the i r 
B r i t i s h counterpar ts , even within formal cent ra l ized decision-making 
s t ruc tu re s (Child and Kieser, 1979). 
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CONCLUSION 
I f we compare the impact of l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s on t h e ba rga in ing 
s t r u c t u r e s of the Dutch non-metalworking i n d u s t r y , the Dutch 
metalworking i n d u s t r y and the B r i t i s h metalworking i n d u s t r y the r e s u l t 
i s as f o l l o w s : 
The c o n c e n t r a t i o n of ownership dur ing the n i n e t e e n s e y e n t i e s has led 
t o changes i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n d u s t r y and company 
b a r g a i n i n g . I t led to the e s t a b l i s h m e n t and growth of 
c o r p o r a t e / d i v i s i o n a l and foreign-owned s u b s i d i a r y b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s i n 
most Dutch non-metalworking i n d u s t r i e s and a r e l a x a t i o n of the r u l e s 
of i n d u s t r y b a r g a i n i n g i n the Dutch metalworking i n d u s t r y . In the 
B r i t i s h eng inee r ing i n d u s t r y i t led to b o t h . 
The s h i f t from i n d u s t r y to company b a r g a i n i n g doesnot n e c e s s a r i l y 
r e p r e s e n t a d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e . The 
i n t e g r a t i o n of ba rga in ing u n i t s w i t h i n l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t s a 
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , r e f l e c t i n g t h e development of dec i s ion-making 
w i t h i n l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n s , i n the wake of the a c t u a l merge r s . 
I n Ho l l and , the l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n as a new focus for the development 
of i n t e r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between unions and employers f i t s 
i n very w e l l indeed wi th the c e n t r a l i s e d and comprehensive n a t u r e of 
Dutch n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . One could say the l a r g e 
c o r p o r a t i o n as a non-vo lun ta ry h i e r a r c h y of companies has r ep l aced the 
employers ' a s s o c i a t i o n as a vo lun t a ry a r rangement . 
I n B r i t i s h eng inee r ing t h i s i n t e g r a t i o n i s l e s s obvious due to 
d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i e s of employers and unions towards c r u c i a l i s s u e s 
such as c o r p o r a t e dev i s ion -mak ing , wage p o l i c y or u n i o n s ' i n t e r n a l 
s t r u c t u r e s . 
With the a id of our concep tua l framework we have i n t e r p r e t e d the 
changes i n ba rga in ing s t r u c t u r e s as changes i n i n t e r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s and r e l a t e d t h e s e to h i s t o r i c a l - s t r u c t u r a l developments 
and to s t r a t e g i e s of t r a d e unions and employers . The simple model 
p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s a r t i c l e , needs f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t i o n and the 
i n c l u s i o n of o t h e r v a r i a b l e s such as government s t r a t e g y . 
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Table 3 Average, yeariy changes In wages and wage drift, 1972-1983 
Wages Wage drift 
Negotiated Earnlngs Structural Wage drift 
wage rates drift 
Food, drink and tobacco 8,1 8,6 0.6 -0,2 
Tinber and furniture 7,1 7,5 0,3 0,1 
Chemlcala 6,7 8.5 0,8 0,8 
Metalworklng 6.7 8,0 0,5 0,8 
total aanufacturlng 
— _ 
7,0 8,3 0.7 0.5 
Source: CBS, 1985 
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